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power from W. VA. CODE ch. 8, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1961), while the
city of St. Albans requires regulatory licenses of plumbing as
provided under the Municipal Home Rule Law. It is to be again
noted that the court in the principal case found no statute under the
provisions of chapter 8 of the West Virginia Code sufficient to give
a corporation the power to require regulatory licensing of plumbers.
There exists considerable confusion between the non-home
rule and home rule provisions of chapter 8 and chapter 8A of the
code. There are now two sets of municipal laws, each supposedly independent of the other, but legislative enactment and court interpretation has made difficult the interpretation of many statutes in
chapters 8 and 8A. To correct the existing condition of municipal
laws, a revised municipal code has been drafted by the Bureau for
Government Research of West Virginia University, consolidating
chapters 8 and 8A into a single chapter. This consolidation and revision will soon be presented for legislative approval, and could
greatly clarify existing municipal corporation law in West Virginia.
John Everett Busch
Torts-Malpractice--Wrongfud Death Action Based on
Breach of Contract
Ps entered into a contract with D, a surgeon, for the performance of a tonsilectomy on their five year old son. The child died
as a result of the operation and Ps brought an action setting forth
claims under the Wrongful Death Act and for breach of contract.
The lower court dismissed the count alleging breach of contract
on the grounds of legal insufficiency. Held, affirmed. A common
law contract action will not lie against a doctor for an alleged
breach of contract resulting in the death of a patient. Such breach
could, however, be the basis of liability under the Wrongful Death
Act, based either upon D's breach of contract or upon tort, as either
theory gives rise to a "default" within the meaning of the act.
Zostautas v. St. Anthony De Padua Hospital, 178 N.E.2d 303 (III.
1961).
The instant case provides a basis for considering the pertinent
West Virginia law in this area. The following questions are raised:
May a recovery under the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act be
based on a breach of contract? May a recovery be had in a
malpractice action based on breach of contract where the malpractice results in the death of the patient?
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The Illinois Wrongful Death Act permits recovery by an administrator where the death is caused by a "wrongful act, neglect or
default" of another who would have been liable in an action by the
decedent if death had not ensued. Iii. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1959).
The West Virginia act is identical in permitting recovery where the
death is caused by "wrongful act, neglect, or default" of another.
W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 7, § 5 (Michie 1961). Despite this identical wording, it is doubtful that West Virginia would permit recovery
under the Wrongful Death Act where the action is based upon
breach of contract. The nature of the action for wrongful death is
generally held to be ex delicto and not ex contractu. In State ex rel.
Yost v. Scouszzio, 126 W. Va. 135, 27 S.E.2d 451 (1943), a personal
representative brought an action under the Wrongful Death Act
based upon a peace bond which the defendant was required to file.
Here, the court held that the action under the act "provides for the
recovery of 'damages' only, and only from the torifeasor, which
presupposes an action in tort." The procedure of the plaintiff in
bringing the action in covenant was an "insuperable obstacle to the
maintenence of the action."
The West Virginia Supreme Court has yet to define the term
"default" as it is used in the Wrongful Death Act. In view of the
existing authority construing that act it appears that the term is
more susceptible of a definition analogous to omission or failure
to act rather than breach of contract. Jones v. Rinehart-Dennis Co.,
113 W. Va. 414, 168 S.E. 482 (1933); Richards v. Iron Works, 56
W. Va. 510, 49 S.E. 437 (1904).
Other jurisdictions have reached conclusions diametrically
opposed to that of the prinicpal case, stating that death resulting
from a failure to perform a duty required only under the terms of
a contract, and not independently thereof, is not within the scope
of the Wrongful Death Act, Dice v. Zweigart, 161 Ky. 646, 171 S.W.
195 (1914); Lewis v. Taylor Coal Co., 112 Ky. 845, 66 S.W. 1044
(1902); the malpractice of a physician amounting to a mere breach
of contract is not a wrongful or negligent act within the meaning
of the wrongful death statute. Thaggard v. Vafes, 218 Ala. 609,
119 So. 647 (1928).
A split of authority exists with regard to whether a cause of
action can be shown where the plaintiff alleges malpractice causing
the death of the patient and bases the action on a breach of contract.
This issue seems to hinge upon whether Lord Ellenborough's dictum
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in the case of Baker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep.
1033 (K.B. 1808), to the effect that "in a civil court the death of a
human being could not be complained of as an injury" would apply
to contract actions where death is caused by the breach, as well
as to tort actions. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REv. 605 (1960). The above rule
has been generally applied to tort and contract cases alike in the
United States, with the exception of an early Connecticut case.
Crofs v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794).
The basic nature of the relationship created between the
physician and his patient could give rise either to a contract or
to a tort action against the physician. The consensual relations of
physician to patient forms the basis of a duty and it is this duty,
when violated by the negligent conduct of the physician, which
gives rise to tort liability. However, malpractice is inextricably
bound up with the idea of breach of implied contract, in that the
physician impliedly promises to use reasonable care, such as is
usually associated with the standards of his profession is similar
localities. Maxwell v. Howell, 114 W. Va. 771, 173 S.E. 553 (1934).
When the physician fails to satisfy this standard, he is held to
have breached the contractual duty owing to his patient. Browning
v. Huffman, 86 W. Va. 468, 103 S.E. 484 (1920); Dye v. Corbin,
59 W. Va. 266, 53 S.E. 147 (1906). For a general discussion of
malpractice, see Posten, The Law of Medical Malpractice in West
Virginia,41 W. VA. L.Q. 35 (1935).
The majority rule seems to be that the mere fact that the
complaint contains allegations relating to a contractual relation
between the decedent and the party allegedly liable for the death
will not defeat the right of action under the death statutes. The
courts generally reach this result by one of two approaches. The
first is to regard the allegations concerning the contract as merely
preliminary statements showing how the defendant's obligation or
duty arose. Here the original allegations are considered as merely
laying the basis for a cause ex delicto. Braun v. Riel, 40 S.W.2d 621
(Mo. Sup. Ct. 1931); Cabe v. Ligon, 115 S.C. 376, 105 S.E. 739
(1920). The second alternative is that the court may take the position that it is immaterial whether the cause of action sounds in
contract or in tort and that it is unnecessary to determine this
question where a statute creates a new cause of action for wrongful
death. Keiper v. Anderson, 138 Minn. 392, 165 N.W. 237 (1917);
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Roche v. St. John's Riverside Hospital, 96 Misc. 289, 160 N.Y. Supp.
401 (1916).
The only case in West Virginia presenting a situation analogous
to the problem is Jones v. Rinehart-Dennis Co., supra, which
involved the death of an employee resulting from silicosis. Maintenence of an action under the Wrongful Death Act was allowed,
although the duty to decedent arose out of the contract of employment. However, this latter point was not raised nor made a part of
the opinion of the court. Rather, the court seemed to rely quite
strongly on the negligence of the employer in failing to provide
proper ventilation and safety devices as the basis of liability.
Where the patient survives the malpractice of the doctor,
there is no question as to the liability of the latter where the
patient can prove negligence. Here, it is generally held that the
action is one for negligence and is predicated on the failure of the
physician to exercise requisite medical skill. Colvin v. Smith, 276
App. Div. 9, 92 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1949). The gravamen of a malpractice
action when the patient survives is the negligence of the physician
and the contract with the patient is only explanatory of how the
former became engaged and serves to raise a duty on his part.
It is the breach of this duty that imposes liability. Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252, 12 S.E. 519 (1890).
Several interesting corollary problems arise with regard to
a malpractice action by a surviving patient. Prior to adoption of
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, a malpractice action
could be sounded in either contract or tort. In the leading case
of Kuhn v. Brownfield, supra, the court held that where a physician
is employed to treat a patient without any express special contract
defining the character and extent of his duties, the plaintiff may
bring an action either in assumpsit or case for the breach of the
implied obligation arising from such employment.
In conclusion, it appears from the Zostautas case, that the
Illinois Supreme Court gave the Wrongful Death Act a liberal
interpretation in order to create a remedy where it felt none
existed. It is difficult to perceive, however, why one would wish
to base liability on breach of contract under the Wrongful Death
Act in a malpractice situation unless the plaintiff could not prove
negligence on the part of the physician. Even in the trial of an
action for breach of contract, it would be necessary, in the absence
of an express agreement to effect a cure, to prove that the physician
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had failed to exercise reasonable and ordinary care such as accords
with the usual standards practiced in similar localities. Maxwell
v. Howell, supra. It would appear that expert testimony would
be necessary to prove liability regardless of whether the action is
based on tort or contract. Sherlag v. Kelly, 200 Mass. 232, 86 N.E.
293 (1908); Miller, The Contractual Liability of Physicians and
Surgeons, 1953 WAsH. U.L.Q. 413. It would appear, therefore, to
be necessary to base a malpractice action to recover for the death
of the patient on breach of contract only in extreme cases.
Ralph Charles Dusic,Jr.

ABSTRACTS
Evidence-Burden of Proof-Alibi
At a criminal trial, the jury was instructed that: "An alibi
will not avail as a defense unless the jury are satisfied by ieliable
and credible testimony that the absence of the defendant has been
so clearly shown that it was impossible for him to have committed
the offenses . .. ." Upon conviction, D appealed. Held, reversed.
The trial court committed reversible error in charging, in effect, that
D bore the burden of proving his defense of alibi. Halko v. State,
175 A.2d 42 (Del. 1961).
When the defense of alibi is asserted, it is commonly held
that the ultimate burden of proving defendant's presence at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission is upon the prosecution, not upon the defendant to show that he was at another
place. 22A C.J.S. CriminalLaw § 574 (1961); 1 WnARToN, CGBMINAL EvmE2cE § 23 (12th ed. 1955). However, some confusion has
arisen because some courts have treated alibi as an affirmative
defense analogous to self-defense. The better view would appear
to be that an alibi is not an affirmative defense as it does not raise
any new matter, but merely denies an essential allegation made
by the prosecution. Annot., 29 A.L.R. 1139 (1924).
The position of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has not been entirely clear. In State v. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 211,
24 S.E. 561, 563 (1896), the court said: "Alibi, being strictly a
defense, must be proven by the defendant. But, the presence of
the accused being necessary to the commission of the offense, the
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